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We estimate the effect on hourly wages and hours of work, of an increase in the number of 
hours of work, defined by law as daytime hours of work. To identify the parameter of 
interest, we estimate difference in difference models. Although we do not know the 
working hour schedule; we exploit the necessary conditions for the intervention to affect 
them, to define treatment and comparison groups. We find that wages of males older than 
25 working in industry in metropolitan areas decreased more than 11% due to the reform, 
while females older than 25 working in industry in metropolitan areas reduced their hours 
of work per week in 3.6 hours. There is evidence, although weaker, of increases in hourly 
wages for male workers in the other sectors of the economy. This suggests that employers 
increased labor demand in those sectors. Overall, the reform would have had positive 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2002, after Colombia had gone through the worst economic crisis since decades, which 
caused a deep labor market crisis, Colombian Congress approved Law 789, a reform to 
labor market regulation. The reform sought to promote active labor market policies and to 
make current legislation more flexible. The active labor market policies included incentives 
to hiring of hard-to-employ workers, a reduction of firing costs, unemployment insurance 
and employment subsidy. On the other hand, the other part of the reform dealt with making 
legislation more flexible by increasing daytime working hours, reducing the overpayment 
for working on Sunday and holydays, and making it possible to make more flexible the 
work schedule. Nonetheless, the law was approved with a constraint on its continuity: if it 
did not render positive results 2 years ahead, it could be modified or rescinded. 
Accordingly, formal evaluations of its effects on labor market performance are necessary. 
 
The scope of the reform can be quantified by estimating the aggregate savings employers 
would have, if we assumed that nothing but daytime hours of work changed. The reform 
only affects formal employees, which are only 33% of total number of employees, and only 
53% of the work force in the formal sector could be treated since the exceptions of the law 
exclude 47% of workers in the formal sector. Finally, let us assume that on average, these 
workers worked at most one out of their 8 daily hours between 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., 
five days per week. We take the quantities shown in table 1 for measuring this effect in 
terms of earnings of formal employees. The resulting upper bound represents 2.7% of that 




Table 1. People and wages for measuring the effects of the reform 
  Number of persons  Mean of the hourly wage
Formal Employees  (A) : 6’621.815  $ 2,520 
Treated Hours/Wages  (A)*0.53*8/8*5*52=(B): 912,486,107 $ 2,900 
    
Savings  (B) * 0.35 * 2,900 : $ 926,934,973,548 
% of Earnings 
of Formal Employees 
  2.7% 
 
This study estimates the effect of the part of the reform which dealt with the change in the 
number of daytime hours of work, on hourly wages and hours of work. The effects on male 
and female workers were estimated for people younger and older than 25. To identify the 
parameter of interest we apply differences in differences. We use Households Survey for 
years before and after the reform (2004 versus 2001). 
 
We find that wages of males older than 25 working in industrial jobs in the metropolitan 
areas decreased more than 11% due to the reform, while females older than 25 working in 
the industrial sector in the metropolitan areas reduced their hours of work per week by 3.6 
hours. We also find an increase of up to 8% in hourly wages of males older than 25 not 
working in industries of the metropolitan areas, and an increase in the hours worked by 
                                                 
1 Those resources are administered by the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, ICBF.    2
those in the industrial sector of up to 3.2 hours per week; although these results are not as 
robust as we would want them to be. On the whole, even though the most reliable results 
we get would not be good news to male industrial workers, there are signs of increases in 
hourly wages for male workers belonging to other sectors of the economy, which might 
bring good news in the short-run. 
 
Seven sessions compose this study. The first is this introduction. The second one presents 
the labor market situation after the economic crisis, which motivated the reform. The third 
session makes a detailed presentation of the part of the labor reform which dealt with 
making legislation more flexible. The fourth session discuses the theoretical implications of 
the reform based on standard labor supply and demand models. The fifth session contains 
the methodological aspects of this work. All the details about the empirical inputs and 
strategies can be found in this latter session. The results of the estimations and a briefing on 
them are in the sixth session. The seventh session resumes and concludes. 
 
2. Labor Market Context before the Reform 
 
In 1995, the unemployment rate for the seven major cities of Colombia matched that which 
was considered to be its natural unemployment rate: 7% (see Figure 1). Nonetheless, crisis 
symptoms extending into the 1996 economic performance (two consecutive quarters of 
negative GDP growth) quickly spread across the labor market. By 1997, the unemployment 
rate already exceeded 11%. 
 
Internal multipliers, namely exchange rate instability, high-standing interest rates –partly a 
consequence of the first factor– and spending cuts, combined with the closure of capital 
markets in 1998 and 1999, brought about the worst crisis in Colombian history, when a -
4.5% slump in the GDP was observed. A crisis of such magnitude prompted deep 
adjustments in the labor market, as it caused inflation to fall way below expectations, which 
meant a considerable increase in real wages and compelled to make adjustments in the 
number of employees. Thus, an announced crisis in the labor market deepened; in the year 
2000, unemployment broke the 19% mark for several periods. The most vulnerable groups 
were the youngest and unskilled workers, who absorbed a large share of the crisis and 
endured unemployment levels rising beyond 20%. 
 
 Despite the fact that the economic crisis was overcome, job creation did not react in the 
same degree. An explanation for this is found in the rigidities of nominal salaries and, in 
general, in the structure of the Colombian labor market. This is the reason why a bill of 
reform of the labor market was proposed, having as its basic objectives those of providing 
flexibility to the labor market and promoting special programs of social protection that 
could reach the vulnerable population, with the aim of offsetting the differential impact that 
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3. Changes Introduced by the Reform 
 
Given the difficulties in the Colombian labor market, the government sought to boost 
growth in employment by promoting active labor market policies and making current 
legislation more flexible. The promotion of active labor market policies was directed 
towards boosting job training programs and making them more flexible, promoting micro-
credit, offering incentives to the hiring of hard-to-employ workers, lowering firing costs, 
and finally, establishing unemployment insurance and employment subsidy. Since most of 
the target population of these policies is vulnerable, this has been referred to as the social 
protection component of the reform. The National Development Plan of President Uribe’s 
government estimated that these policies would generate 390,916 jobs between 2003 and 
2006
2.  A key element in the reform was article 46 of Law 789, which conditions its 
continuity to its having accomplished positive improvements in employment after 
completing its second year. 
 
The preliminary results of these policies have been analyzed by the National Government, 
unions, industry, and academics
3. Regretfully, little if any consensus comes out of these 
studies. Clearly, entrepreneurs and the government are more prone to conclude that 
elements of the reform were fundamental to the observed increase in employment rates 
during 2003 than are unions and academics. However, inferences of the latter do not 
converge on the government’s conclusions either. Unions, on their part, demand that 
several points of the Law be reversed, based on article 46, claiming that, other than 
lowering employee wages, it has not had any positive effect on employment. As for 
academics, they find mixed results deriving from the Law.  
 
                                                 
2 Department of National Planning (2003). 
3 For examples of the different perspectives, see: in Ministry of Social Protection (2005), of the government; 
in ANDI (2004), of unions and industry; and, in Ferné (2004), Gaviria (2005) and López et al. (2005), of 
academics.    4
There are more expectations than actual results in some of its programs, since their 
implementation has not had enough time to prove their worth. That is the case of 
unemployment and employment insurance and employment subsidy
4. 
 
The other part of the reform, which dealt with making legislation more flexible, was 
expected, according to the National Development Plan, to generate 95,147 job places 
between 2003 and 2006




Table 2. Main changes introduced to the work schedule by Law 789/2002 
Article 160.  Definition of day and night working hours 
  Article 25, Law 789/2002  Original Text 
Daytime  Working Hours  
Nighttime Working Hours  
6:00 a.m. - 10:00 p.m. 
10:00 p.m. - 6:00 a.m. 
6:00 a.m. - 6:00 p.m. 
6:00 p.m. - 6:00 a.m. 
 
Article 179.  Extra payment  for Sunday and holiday labor 
  Article 26, Law 789/2002  Original Text 
Extra payment for Sunday 
and holiday labor 
 
Additional  extra payment 
when Sunday/Holiday does 
not belong to the daily 
working schedule  
 
Exceptions 









When agreed standard 
working hours are up to 
36 








When agreed standard 
working hours are up to 36 
 
Article 161. Daily and weekly standard working hours  
  Article 51, Law 789/2002  Original Text 
Weekly Standard 
Hours for Workers 
under 18 and over 
16 
 
Flexibility of daily 
and weekly 
working schedules 




Employer and employee can temporally or 
permanently agree on an uninterrupted 
working schedule as long as the employee 




Employer and employee can agree on a daily 
Up to 8 
hours/day and 48 
hours/week 
 
Same as in Law 
789/2002, but 
restricted to new 
firms or new 
activities. 
                                                 
4 See Gaviria (2005). 
 
6 “Continuity solution” implies, among other things, that workers are paid for Sundays and holidays not 
worked, either fully, if worked all other days, or proportionally to the weekly days worked.    5
working schedule that can go from 4 to 10 
hours a day, up to 6 days per week, with no  
overtime payment, as long as the weekly 
hours, not exceeding 48, lie within the 6:00 
a.m. to 10:00 p.m. daily working session. 
 
From the aforementioned, significant reductions are expected in revenues of employees 
whose working schedules lie within time spans considered by the law; in other words, of 
employees whose working session before the law became effective covered some of the 
intervals that the reform takes into consideration, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., and 
Sundays. Unsurprisingly, the impact is not the same for revenues of those having working 
sessions with hours that lie between 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., nor for those having Sunday 
working hours with extra payment. Changes in overpayments implied by law 789 are 
shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Changes introduced by the reform in the working schedule 
 Overtime Premium  Type of hours  Considered hours 
Before the Law  After the Law 
Standard  6:00 p.m.-10:00 p.m.  WN=1.35W W 
Overtime  6:00 p.m.-10:00 p.m.  WEN=1.75W WE=1.25W 
Standard 
Overtime 
Sunday or Holidays  2.00 W  1.75 W 
 
That is, before the law, when standard hours included some within the 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 
p.m. interval, workers were paid the night premium, WN=35%, and when these hours were 
not standard but extra, they were paid the night overtime premium: WEN=75%. After the 
law, these figures became W=0%, and WE=25%, respectively. That is to say, night hours 
before the law now become standard hours, and overtime night hours become just regular 
overtime hours. Hours worked on Sundays or holidays receive a differential treatment; the 
reform introduced a direct reduction in the premium. However, the reform does not modify 
restrictions regarding the standard working schedule: currently, workers still cannot work 
more than 8 standard hours, and 2 overtime hours per day, six days a week. 
 
Some effects are more difficult to determine, as it is the case of those deriving from the 
possibility of a flexible working schedule –in point of fact, the inclusion performed by 
sentence (d) of the law, under numeral 3 of article 161 of the Labor Code (Código 
Sustantivo del Trabajo), by means of which, under certain circumstances that are not 
difficult to meet, there can be a 48-hour working session without any type of overpayment. 
 
Gaviria (2005) and Núñez (2005) assess the impact of this component of the reform on 
several potential outcomes, namely formality, employment, and the duration of 
employment and unemployment. The first of these studies does not find significant results 
of the reform on formality or employment, while the second one finds some favorable 
effects of the reform on the duration of unemployment. 
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4. Theoretical Implications of the Reform 
 
This section illustrates the major implications suggested by the standard models of labor 
supply and demand on the basis of which the results of empirical exercises will be 
interpreted.  
 
4.1 Labor Supply 
 
The effects on the labor supply that have resulted from the measures depicted earlier can be 
illustrated on the basis of a standard model of labor supply.  
 
In this model, the agent’s problem is how to maximize his utility function: U(C, L), while 
being subject to a budget constrain: C ≤ W(24 - L) + F, in which C stands for Consumption, 
L for Leisure, W for his real wage per hour, and F for his non-labor income. The result of 
this model is the supply of labor hours: H=24-L, as a function of his real wage and non-
labor revenues: H(W,F). Corresponding to this function is the following empirical model, 




Even though changes in salaries have in general an ambiguous effect on the supply of labor 
hours, the α coefficient represents the net effect between substitution and income.  
 
Next, the worker’s response will be defined, in light of the different possibilities deriving 
from the changes introduced by labor reform. Specifically, a presentation follows of the 
modification that the different cases resulting from said reform imply over the budgetary 
restriction of agents, and the worker’s response that is to be expected. For the purpose of 
that presentation, the notation to be employed in terms of salaries is previously defined, as 
follows:  
 
•  W = daytime-standard hourly wage 
•  WE = daytime-overtime hourly wage (1.25*W) 
•  WN = nighttime- standard hourly wage (1.35*W) 
•  WEN = nighttime- overtime hourly wage (1.75*W) 
 
The equivalence between the different wages and the daytime-standard wage originates in 
legislation now in force. That equivalence was not subject to change when the labor reform 
was enacted. 
 
Cases to be considered are likewise described, always bearing in mind that the standard 
working session cannot exceed the 8-hour a day and 48-hour a week limits, and that the 
overtime working hours cannot exceed 2 hours a day and 12 hours a week. 
 
Case 1: Working session starts before 8:00 a.m. and ends before 6:00 p.m. or begins after 
10:00 p.m. and ends after 8:00 a.m.  
 
e F W X H + + + + = δ α β β0 ( ) 1   7
Case 2: Working session starts after 8:00 a.m. and ends after 6:00 p.m. or begins before 
12:00 p.m. and ends before 10:00 p.m. 
 
Case 3: Working session starts after 12:00 p.m. and ends after 10:00 p.m. or begins before 
10:00 p.m. and ends before 8:00 a.m. 
 
These cases are graphically illustrated with a brief analysis of their effect on the labor 
supply of work. For the purpose of solving the theoretical ambiguity in the cases in which 
there is a reduction in the hourly wage, one of the results of the empirical models derived 
from estimating the (1) equation is taken as the basis, and the fact is that in all estimations 
performed the interest coefficient α is positive. In this sense, it will be assumed that, in 
general, reductions in the hourly wage will imply reductions in the number of hours 
worked.  
 
Case 1: No effect on the labor supply: In this case, the working session does not include 
hours within the interval that is subject of consideration by the reform and, therefore, there 
is not any alteration of the budget constrain. Consequently, with preferences given as fixed, 
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Figure 3. Case 2: Reduction in hours of work 
 
Case 2: Reduction in hours of work: In this case, there are two situations observed. In 
both cases, it is assumed that the worker maximizes his utility by placing him within the 
interval that goes from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. In the first, however, these are standard 
working hours, whereas in the second case those are extra hours. In both cases there is an 
hourly wage reduction, and thus, on the basis of our assumptions, working hours would be 
reduced without ambiguity.  
 
Figure 4. Case 3: Increase in hours of work 














Case 3: Increment in hours of work: This case requires from the working session to 
include hours of work immediately before and after 10:00 p.m., and from the employee to 
work overtime. In this case, the marginal wage of the worker does not change, and 
therefore, the only effect taking place is the rent effect. Thus, it follows that in this case 
working hours would increase without ambiguity. 
 
In summary, some intervals can be described which, by having non-void intersections with 
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Figure 5. Characterization of working hours affected by the reform 










4.2 Labor Demand  
 
In order to illustrate the effects of the reform over the labor demand, the standard firm’s 
benefit maximization approximation is used.
7 In this case, employers evaluate the 
opportunity cost of hiring new employees against contracting additional hours from current 
employees. That is, firms maximize 
 
 
Where h are the total hours, h_6-10 are the hours of work that take place not between 6:00 
p.m. and 10:00 p.m., N is the number of workers, f are the fixed costs per worker, r is the 
cost of capital rent, K is capital, and p is the premium per hours worked between 6:00 p.m. 
and 10:00 p.m.
8 The marginal cost of an additional worker per h* hours is 
And 
the 
marginal cost of h* hours worked by an already-hired employee is 
If the ratio between the marginal cost of a new employee and that of the extra hours of a 
person already hired changes by means of the reform, a change takes place in the optimum 
ratio of employees on overtime hours. The same thing happens if the ratio changes between 
the marginal cost of a new employee working on a daily shift and that of a current 
employee working overtime. The following table illustrates this change in the marginal 
costs ratio through a quantitative exercise that helps in exemplifying the employers’ 




                                                 
7 See Hamermesh (1993) 
8 If hours of work are among the standard hours of work, then the premium before the reform was that for 
night hours (WN), while after the reform there would be no premium (W). If those were extra hours of work, 
then the premium before the reform was that for extra nightly hours (WEN), while after the reform it would be 
jus that for extra hours (WE). 
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Table 4. Change in relative costs due to the reform
9 
  Before the reform  After the reform 
Current worker 
Overtime hours (h ≥ hs)  6:00 p.m.-10:00 p.m.  6:00 p.m.-10:00 p.m. 
Marginal Cost  WEN = 1.75W  WE = 1.25W  
Additional worker 
Standard Hours (h < hs)  6:00 p.m.-10:00 p.m.  6:00 p.m.-10:00 p.m. 
Marginal Cost  WN = 1.35W  W 
Relative Cost  WEN/WN = 1,296  WE/W = 1,25 
        
If employers have job requirements within the time span considered by the law, from 6:00 
p.m. to 10:00 p.m., the relative cost of additional hours of the current staff in relation with 
that of the newly hired employees fell 4.6%. It can be deduced from this that employers 
have incentives for contracting more overtime hours, in detriment of the hiring of new 
employees.
10 On the other hand, the reduction in the marginal cost due to the lower cost of 
hours between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. would increase the number of employees. The total effect 




This section describes the available data for making estimations, and the way in which the 
effect of the reform will be identified. The starting point is the empirical method to be used; 
later, data are described, and finally, the treated and comparison groups are defined, as well 





Empirical exercises herein are making use of data from the Continued Survey of 
Households that the national statistics agency – DANE – conducts. This survey is also 
known by its Spanish acronym: ECH, which we will use ahead. The objective of the said 
survey is to monitor the performance of the Colombian labor market throughout the year. 
The ECH allows us to make representative inferences about the 13 major metropolitan 
areas in the country, and each one of the urban and rural areas. In particular, it uses the 
information available for the second quarter of years 2001 through 2004, which includes a 
                                                 
9 Assumes f=0 for simplicity. 














MC MC s h N , and since the reform is basically a reduction 
in p, then it follows that because of the reform, the marginal costs of an extra employee would increase 
relative to the marginal cost of an extra hour of work.    11
special questions set (module) on informality. The latter contains information regarding 
affiliations to the pension system and to the social security healthcare, and also about the 
size of the firm where workers are employed, among others. Additionally, the ECH 
contains information relating to the company’s economic activity (industry, retail, services, 
etc.), the occupation (employee, factory worker, independent, etc.) and the worker’s 
occupational ranking (professional, technician, etc.). This survey contains only information 
of a transversal nature, and although it includes some retrospective information on workers, 
it is minimal.  
 
5.2 Empirical Model   
 
In order to capture the effect that the law had on the population that it took into 
consideration, the methodology of differences in differences
11 is used. The parameter of 
interest for being estimated is the impact of the treatment on the treated (TT). The spirit of 
this methodology is estimating the difference existing between the group that received the 
intervention, or treated group, a group that has not been affected by it, or a comparison 
group retaining the most similar possible conditions to those of the treatment group. This 
difference is estimated after the reform, and it compares with the same difference estimated 
before the reform was enacted, which is assumed as the difference that should exist 
between the groups after the reform, and in its absence.  
 
Such methodology employs the interaction between the variable that identifies the treated 
individual and the variable that identifies if, by the moment of taking the sample, the 
intervention was in effect, in our case, the labor reform.  
 
This means that any variable, y, would be explained by a set of exogenous variables, x, and 
the variables treated, t, reform, R, and the interaction of the treated and treatment variables, 
tR: 
 
ε θ γ β α + + + + = tR R t x y   
 
In which θ  represents the impact of the reform, i.e. the TT.  
 
Even though under the methodology’s assumptions it is possible to identify the parameter 
of interest, these assumptions have some limitations. On one hand, the assumption that the 
differences existing between the treatment and comparison groups before the reform are 
maintained after it implies that any change in the latter, determined by reasons outside the 
reform, would be wrongly attributed to it by the model
12. Another limitation to the model 
                                                 
11 See Costa (2000), Gaviria (2005), Hamermesh and Trejo (2000), Hunt (1996, 1998, 1999), Kugler (2004), 
and Núñez (2004) among others. 
12 Trends or hysteresis in the labor market. If it were possible to perform an experimental design in which the 
reform would only be implemented for some randomly selected regions of the country, one could assume that 
the treated regions and the non-treated ones have the same tendencies. And also, in the case that some reasons 
not related with the reform affected them (in our case, they might include: change in government –internal 
safety and economic policies-, changes in the macroeconomic scenario –interest and exchange rates, fiscal 
balance, etc.-, and the minimum wage), that effect would be equally transmitted to both regions. In such a 
situation it would possible to apply a triple difference, obtaining a net result from our double difference, the 
() 5   12
would be the endogenous nature of the treatment group, mainly referring to the moment of 
defining the adopted treatment group.  
 
Based on the aforementioned, the importance stands clear of making an adequate selection 
of the treated and comparison groups, which would be appropriate for obtaining a 
consistent estimation of the effects from the reform.  
 
5.3 Definition of the treatment and comparison groups 
 
As it was said earlier, treated by the reform is the employee who before it became in force 
used to work between 6:00 p.m. and 10 p.m., worked on Sundays or holidays, or had a 
homogeneous schedule before the reform, and after it he shifted to having a flexible 
working hours. Also treated are those who before the reform used to be jobless or inactive, 
and because of the reform they altered their labor-related decisions. 
 
The available information does not allow us to determine which unemployed or inactive 
persons were susceptible to treatment by the reform, and the employees who were treated 
by the reform cannot be perfectly determined by it either, since there are no questions on 
his working hours. In this restriction lies the difficulty in achieving an adequate assessment 
of the reform’s impact. Even though it is not possible to determine the treated and 
comparison groups with the desired degree of accuracy, it is possible to define them based 
on some necessary conditions for individuals to belong to each of these groups.  
 
For the treated group, the current legislation allows establishing a necessary condition 
which becomes a good approximation for its definition. In particular, under numeral 162 of 
the Labor Code (Código Sustantivo de Trabajo), the set of norms that regulate the 
Colombian labor market, specifies that the regulation concerning the legal maximum 
working session does not cover workers who perform directive or managerial activities, or 
have a position of trust in the employer’s organization. Additionally, it is clear that this 
condition may be enforceable exclusively within the formal sector of the economy. Based 
on the aforementioned, our treatment group will be defined by all employees of the formal 
sector performing in jobs covered by the regulation on maximum working session. Even 
though this definition includes within the treated group some individuals who were not 
necessarily treated by the reform, we do know that anyone having been treated by it 
belongs to the said group. Along these lines, belonging to the treated group constitutes a 
necessary, though not sufficient condition, for its integrants to be treated. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Colombian labor reform had nationwide coverage. For this reason, it 
is not possible to find people employed in the formal sector, performing in working posts 
covered by the regulation regarding the maximum working-session length, and yet not 
being simultaneously susceptible of receiving an impact from the reform. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
difference in time of the non-treated region, and thus obtain the parameter of interest. Among the 
interventions that might affect differently treatment and control groups we find the changes in the minimum 
wage, nonetheless, changes in its level was small during the three years previous to the reform.    13
Forming part of the set of possible comparison groups are employees that belong to the 
informal sector, or those in the formal sector performing in jobs not covered by the change 
in the number of daytime working hours. The most convenient comparison group should 
have characteristics that are as similar as possible to those of the treated group. Thus the 
trade-off between these possible comparison groups depends on whether differences 
between formal and informal sectors are larger than those between employees in the formal 
sector affected or not by the reform. 
 
Therefore, we define the comparison group as the one comprised by individuals belonging 
to the formal sector who occupy working posts that are not affected by the change in the 
number of daytime working hours. The reason for this is that interventions affecting the 
treated group would more likely have a similar impact on this group than on the one 
consisting in workers employed in the informal sector, which displays a different 
functionality than that of the formal one. 
 
Hence, the comparison group is composed of those individuals performing in directive or 




The definition of formality is the subject of ongoing controversy, both inside the borders 
and internationally. With the aim of defining the group of individuals belonging to the 
formal sector, this paper adopts a conservative definition, according to which the person 
employed must act as a worker or employee, in a firm with a minimum staff of 11, and 
must be covered by social security in terms of healthcare and pensions.
14 
 
In summary, our treatment and control groups are: 
 
a.  Treated: employees or workers in a large company with affiliation to healthcare and 
pensions, who are not performing in a directive or managerial job and do not have a 
position of trust within the organization.  
b.  Comparison: employees or workers in a large company with affiliation to healthcare 
and pensions, who are performing in a directive or managerial job or have a position of 
trust within the organization. 
 
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of hourly wages and hour of work per week for four different 
types of workers: our treatment and comparison groups, and those working in the formal 
and informal sector respectively. The evolution is shown for the whole sample, and 
additionally, for workers in industry. The group of formal employees is mostly composed 
by our treatment group, thus the similarity in these curves. Nonetheless, as previously 
stated, among the formal there are several untreated individuals that are actually excluded 
from that group in order to compose our comparison group. 
                                                 
13 For further details on those jobs, the attached annex shows the working posts used for control, those 
corresponding to treated group, and some that are excluded from the exercise. 
14 The incorporation of conditions additional to this one, such as having a work contract and working inside 
the company’s facilities, do not significantly alter the definitions of the treated or comparison groups. 
    14
 
 
Figure 6. Hourly wages and weekly hours of work by type of worker 
  
Maybe the more relevant information to extract from the figure is that our treatment and 
comparison groups follow similar patterns along the period, mostly between 2001 and 
2003, the closest pre-treatment period. If anything, there might be a slight relative increase 
in weekly hours of work of the treated relative to the comparison group, which might lead 
to overestimate the effect of the reform on weekly hours of work. 
 
On concern of our approach is the potential endogeneity of our treatment group. 
Conceptually, there should not be much discretion upon individuals in terms of their 
choosing whether to belong to the treatment group or not, since their being assigned to a 
directive or managerial job is the result of a process that takes place after several years of 
proving their potential, and such decision would depend relatively much more on many 
other variables than just what is determined by the labor reform under study. On the other 
hand, empirically we can show that individuals stay either in the treated or comparison 
groups in a very stable way. Transition’s matrix between treated and comparison groups is 
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Table 5. Transition’s matrix 
Current Classification 
  Comparison Treated Total 
643,616 158,136  801,752 
80.28  19.72  100  Comparison
63.51  7.88  26.54 
369,868 1,849,260 2,219,128 
16.67  83.33  100  Treated 
36.49  92.12  73.46 
1,013,484 2,007,396 3,020,880 


























100  100  100 
 
If one individual has already been treated, the probability of his continuing to be treated is 
83%. For those initially in the comparison group, the probability of continuing being in that 
group is 80%. Therefore, the flow of people between the treated and comparison group is 
actually small. 
 
5.4 Comparison with other definitions 
 
Two studies precede ours in the attempt to assess labor reform. First, Gaviria (2004) defines 
as treatment group one made up of individuals within companies belonging to the industrial 
sector, in order to determine the impact of the reform on the degree of work formality, and 
also of individuals in larger size companies, in order to determine its effect on employment. 
His comparison group is the complement of the treated group. According to his line of 
reasoning, it is within those categories that individuals can be found who are susceptible of 
being treated by the law. 
 
Secondly, Núñez (2004) conducted exercises seeking to determine the impact of the reform 
on the duration of employment and unemployment. From those, only the first would be 
somehow comparable to our exercise, the one on job duration, in which he uses the same 
definition as ours of the formal sector. In order to define the treatment group, he selects 
individuals within the formal sector, belonging to the fields of services, trade, industry and 
financial institutions. Additionally, given that his study focuses on the job duration, he only 
takes those employees of less than 10 years in service. His comparison group excludes the 
complement of the formal sector, which is not part of the treatment group.  
 
In summary, both studies base their treatment and comparison groups in the economic 
activity sectors in which the employed persons perform. In this sense, our definitions of 
treatment and comparison coincide only partially with those of the other two papers, as 
Table 2A of the appendix shows. This means that, for the purpose of identifying the impact 
of the reform, only the population included in our definition would meet the necessary 
conditions for belonging to the treated group, and that included in our comparison group, 
with reasons enough for belonging to that group. Any of the two definitions used by the 
other studies excludes from its treated group those individuals who are effectively treated    16
by the reform, and includes in their comparison group those individuals that the reform 
effectively considers. 
 
5.5 Determination of the comparison year  
 
Given that the data available for performing this assessment correspond to the informality 
modules in the ECH survey, available only for the second quarters of 2001, 2002, 2003 and 
2004, the sample is limited to 2001, 2002 and 2004, given that the reform became in force 
in April 2003, thereby making it impossible to determine if that year is in fact treated or not 
by the reform. Deduced from the latter is that the reference line, year in which the reform 
was not in effect and that is used in comparing against the presence of the reform in action, 
should be 2001, 2002, or either one. Among the possible options, 2002 is a particularly 
negative year for the Colombian labor market, and therefore, selecting it imposes a bias to 
our intention of capturing the effects of the reform. The following table shows some 
evidence of the poor performance of the Colombian labor market recorded in 2002, in 
relation with 2001. 
 
Table 6. Evolution of key indicators of Colombian labor market, 2001-2002 
  Global 






Change  -0.4 -0.8  0.7 2.8 
* Defined as the share of employed people under poor conditions of work. 
 
5.6 Demographic groups studied 
 
Remaining to be determined are the population groups which would allow for better 
distinguishing the reform’s effects from other contemporary effects. Gender is already a 
standard population group. Additionally, it is important to differentiate the possible effect 
that the labor reform may have had on people who have completed their academic 
formation and on those who have not. The first of those groups is subject to other 
interventions that the labor reform incorporates. Consequently, within each gender, a group 
of individuals with ages up to 25 years or older. 
 
5.7 Description of the estimation process 
 
Equation (5) is estimated to asses the impact of the labor reform on hourly wages and the 
number of hours worked per week. The next step in this process is the approximation used 
by Mroz (1987). That is to say, using a model of participation, the equations of hourly wage 
and worked hours are corrected according to selection bias. The hours’ equation is 
estimated in both its structural form (including the hourly wage as the explicative variable) 
and in its reduced form. The equations of wages and participation depend on all the 
exogenous variables of the model, which include the characteristics of the individual, its 
socioeconomic environment, and several interactions and transformations upon them. In the 
structural equation per hours the hourly wage’s endogenous nature is corrected.    17
Understandably, the equations of wage and hours, as well as the participation equation, 
incorporate a considerable number of control variables of multiple origins: 
 
•  Geographic variables: these are dummy variables identifying the different 
metropolitan areas (in the sample that only considers these) or the urban and rural 
sectors, in the case of the sample that considers both sectors.  
 
•  Household’s demographic variables: these are variables describing the demographic 
composition of the household, including: presence of children, adolescents, elderly or 
handicapped family members.   
 
•  Household’s socioeconomic variables: by means of these variables, it is intended to 
capture some of the essence of the individual’s socioeconomic environment; variables 
prevailing are those of revenues of the other household members, both in monetary 
terms as in their proximity to the minimum wage, in addition to variables such as 
education and the average working experience for the household.  
 
•  Individual’s variables: also necessary are certainly variables describing the observed 
individual, which are of common usage in literature, namely sex, ranges of education, 




With the purpose of verifying the sturdiness of results from the different specifications of 
equation (5), assessment was conducted of 7 alternative models. Of those models, 5 are 
defined in the universe of the 13 largest metropolitan areas, of which the survey is 
representative, and the remaining 2 employ a sample covering the urban and rural sectors. 
The first five models include three in which the only variable measuring the effect of the 
reform is defined on the basis of the definition by Gaviria (2004), G, Núñez (2004), N, and 
ours, E&M. Additionally, two models are presented, one of which includes the definition of 
treatment by E&M, that by N, and their interaction; and also another in which that by E&M 
is included together with that by G, and their interaction. Even though the first three models 
record the separate effects of each one of the variables included, only those which continue 
to record the said effects in the following two models will have a final effect on the variable 
of interest.  
 
The other two models present, in only one of them, the definition of treatment by E&M, 
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Table 7. Impact of the reform according to different models and definitions of treatment group. Males 
N G N, E&M G, E&M E&M N G N, E&M G, E&M E&M N G N, E&M G, E&M E&M
N 0,14 ** -3,49 -1,96
G -0,05 3,41 ** 3,82 **
N, E&M 0,12 0,21 -0,23 -1,75 -5,55 1,14 3,59 -11,4 ** 3,99
G, E&M -0,12 0,08 0,02 3,50 * 3,20 -5,90 * 4,24 ** 2,44 -3,61
E&M 0,04 -4,61 * -2,42
N, G, E&M 0,09 -0,06 0,29 -0,06 -0,24 * -4,44 2,41 -6,57 6,18 0,85 3,62 3,61 ** -14,7 ** 5,09 4,90 **
E&M 0,04 -5,47 ** -2,42
N -0,04 0,04 ** 0,12
G -0,00 0,39 0,38
N, E&M -0,05 -0,12 0,18 ** -2,16 5,11 ** -2,71 * -1,80 5,68 ** -3,66 **
G, E&M 0,12 * -0,19 ** 0,08 * -0,13 2,14 -1,10 -0,80 3,17 * -1,57
E&M 0,04 -0,62 -0,88
N, G, E&M -0,11 0,11 * -0,01 -0,09 0,13 * -1,48 -0,00 3,01 1,19 -1,19 -1,03 -0,57 3,16 1,65 -1,84
E&M 0,04 0,14 -0,88
N -0,01 -0,21 -0,15
G -0,10 1,04 * 1,05 *
N, E&M -0,06 -0,03 0,11 ** -2,01 3,52 * -2,22 -1,18 3,14 -2,58 *
G, E&M 0,05 -0,12 * 0,07 0,73 2,08 -1,63 * 0,50 2,57 * -1,85 *
E&M 0,04 -0,93 -1,11
N, G, E&M -0,09 0,05 0,09 -0,07 0,05 -1,49 0,64 1,14 1,56 -0,64 -0,64 0,55 0,35 1,66 -0,70
E&M 0,03 -0,32 -0,42
Men younger than 25 years
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Table 8. Impact of the reform according to different models and definitions of treatment group. Females 
 
N G N, E&M G, E&M E&M N G N, E&M G, E&M E&M N G N, E&M G, E&M E&M
N 0,13 ** 3,88 * 1,99
G 0,00 1,69 1,59
N, E&M 0,18 * -0,17 0,09 6,11 * -4,11 0,25 4,35 * -2,35 -0,80
G, E&M -0,11 0,15 0,07 -0,05 -0,63 1,19 0,33 -1,20 1,11
E&M 0,09 1,00 0,81
N, G, E&M 0,12 -0,09 -0,11 0,13 0,08 7,86 ** 0,65 -5,23 -1,90 0,24 5,48 ** 0,60 -1,96 -1,68 -2,18
E&M 0,10 0,91 0,81
N 0,09 ** 1,33 * 1,13 *
G 0,03 1,77 ** 1,71 **
N, E&M 0,09 -0,11 0,12 1,67 -0,29 -0,78 1,85 -0,50 -0,89
G, E&M 0,06 -0,01 0,05 2,66 ** -3,55 ** 0,44 2,55 ** -3,58 ** 0,53
E&M 0,05 -0,05 0,01
N, G, E&M 0,05 0,07 -0,01 -0,04 0,05 1,31 2,60 ** 0,81 -3,40 ** -1,31 1,52 2,44 ** 0,44 -3,48 ** -1,17
E&M 0,04 -0,34 0,01
N 0,10 ** 1,68 ** 1,32 **
G 0,20 1,83 ** 1,80 **
N, E&M 0,10 * -0,11 0,13 * 2,31 * -0,94 -0,32 2,25 ** -0,82 -0,66
G, E&M 0,02 0,02 0,06 2,47 ** -3,51 ** 0,76 2,50 ** -3,66 ** 0,83
E&M 0,07 ** 0,34 0,37
N, G, E&M 0,04 0,03 -0,02 -0,01 0,58 ** 2,28 * 2,45 ** 0,18 -3,42 ** -1,10 1,99 * 2,33 ** 0,46 -3,34 ** -1,50
E&M 0,06 ** 0,04 -0,01










































































Women younger than 25 years
Variables






































*    Significant 10% confidence level 
**  Significant 5% confidence level  





6.1.1 Metropolitan areas 
 
For males older than 25 we find that workers in N work 5.7 hours more per week, while 
those in the complement of N work 3.7 hours less due to the reform. The 3.7 reduction in 
hours of work for treated individuals in the complement of N, is observed simultaneously 
with an increase of 18% between 2001 and 2004 in their hourly wages.
16 That is, for treated 
workers not in N, the reform reduced their hours of work and increased their hourly wages. 
Table 9 illustrates the relative changes in hourly wages between workers in N and in its 
complement, between 2001 and 2004. 
 
Table 9. Change in relative wages of N and its complement between 2001 and 2004 
   N  Complement of N   N/Complement of N 
2004 0.631  0.677  1.073  Treated/ 
Comparison  2001 0.595  0.538  0.905 
2004/2001 1.061  1.258  1.186 
 
Even though in all cases the treated earn lower wages than the comparison workers, their 
hourly wages increased relative to those of the comparison workers in both N and its 
complement, with a remarkable increase in the complement of N. The net unconditional 
increase in hourly wages of the treated relative to comparison workers was 6.1% in N and 
25.8% in its complement. The increase in this ratio between workers in the complement of 
N and those in N was 18.6% between 2001 and 2004. 
 
Clearly, this effect on hourly wages must have been driven by labor demand. Sectors in the 
complement of N include farming, mining, construction, transport and telecommunications, 
which grew between 2001 and 2004 about 3%, 4.4%, 12.2% and 4% respectively, in a 
period in which the economy grew around 3.3%.
17 Since labor reform provides the same 
conditions to sector in and out of N, it seems difficult to argue that the better performance 
of the complement of N relative to N, was merely due to the reform. In addition, the 
comparability of these sets of sectors has another difficulty: there are not balanced by 
gender. As it is shown in table %%%, most of the employees in our sample, who work in 
sectors not in N, are males. This lack of balance is likely to produce biased results, in 
particular, when trying to estimate the impact of the reform for females. 
 
 
                                                 
15 The effect of the reform in the weekly hours is measure with the reduced form equation. That equation 
measures the net effect of the reform. 
16 An employee could be in our definition and not in N, when he is treated and works in economic sectors like 
farming, mining, construction, transport and telecommunications, or when his tenure is higher than 10 years 
old regardless of its economic sector. 
17 Industry in this period grew 3%, much closer to Colombian economy’s rate.    21
   Núñez  Núñez complement 
 Service  Trade  Industry Fin.  I.
* Farming Mine Construction  T&T
 * 
Male 35.1%  61.2%  61.2%  46.9%  86.9%  94.1% 89.8%  87.3% 
Female 64.9% 38.8% 38.8%  53.1%  13.1%  5.9%  10.2%  12.7% 
Fin. I.: Financial Institutions, T&T: Transport and Telecommunications. 
 
Thus, in this case, one of the key assumptions of the differences in differences empirical 
strategy, namely, that interventions different to the labor reform, would affect similarly 
treatment and comparison group, might be violated.
18 
 
The model with definitions of G and E&M finds a negative effect of the reform on the 
hourly wages of treated employees working in industry and a weakly positive effect for 
those in the other sectors. The positive effect in the treated not in N is also a finding for the 
sample of all the males. According to the results, males in all sectors but industry had 
increases of up to 8% in hourly wages, while those in industry would have had a reduction 
of 11% in theirs, consistent with a much larger share of workers working continuously in 
the production of goods, and thus, affected in a larger proportion with the changes 
introduced in work schedule compensation between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m. This result emerges 
despite the weak increase in hourly wages in industry, what makes clearer the role of the 
reform in terms of affecting specifically the hourly wages of the treated relative to the 
comparison group. A weak positive effect on hour of work, 3.2 hours per week, is found for 
workers in industry. 
 
Let us go back to the finding that workers in N work 5.7 hours more per week, while those 
in the complement of N work 3.7 hours less due to the reform. There are two effects that 
might be driving the 5.7 hours per week increase: on one side, there can be a set of 
employees who work during late hours, with work schedules in these sectors ending after 
10:00 p.m., in which case, we know the income effect would induce them to work more 
hours while earning the same marginal wage, being this result consistent with the null 
effect found on hourly wages for this group. Nonetheless, such work schedule is unlikely to 
represent the median employee in sectors included in N. Also, we know that with the 
reduction in hourly wages from 6 to 10 p.m., employers would be willing to raise daily 
wage a positive amount and while still keeping a share of the savings. On the other hand, 
we know that it is in the interval from 6 to 10 p.m. in which firms would be willing to 
increase the relative number of extra hours due to the reform, thus the observed increase in 
hours might be driven by an increase in demand in sectors included in N relative to those in 
its complement. In this case, firms would offer higher hourly wages for the new extra 
hours, contributing this way to explain the null effect observed in hourly wages. Still, other 
forces might be at work to explain this increase in hours of work, and definitely, one such 
reason might have to do with the mentioned fact that sectors N and its complement would 
not be comparable. 
 
For males under 25, the reform only has effects for the treated employees included in N, a 
large negative effect of 11 hours a week. This effect is consistent with the view according 
                                                 
18 This point must be borne in mind from now on when interpreting the inclusion of N in our models.    22
to which these individuals had dropped out, or reduced the intensity of their education 
activities during Colombian’s economic crisis, in order to work; but by 2004, this process 
was reversed. Nonetheless, it is not clear why such effect would be only significant for 
young males in N but not in its complement. Notice that the effect of the reform on this 
specific subset of males was concealed in the estimation that included only E&M but not N. 
Here again, the caveats mentioned previously related to the comparability of sectors in N 
and its complement apply. 
 
On the other hand, young male workers in industry increased their hours of work more than 
4 hours, nonetheless, according to our treated definition, it is unlikely that such effect had 
been caused by the reform. No effect on wages due to the reform is observed for this group. 
 
6.1.2 Urban and rural areas 
 
In this sample, all significant effects of the reform are in the males younger than 25 years. 
The 3.6 additional hours per week in the industry is not a consequence of the reform but 
just a fixed effect of that sector. The reduction in hours per week for the treated employees 
in N found for the metropolitan areas remains. In this case though, this effect is for workers 
in  N net of those in industry, and has a higher magnitude: 14.7 hours per week. The 
intuition presented for the metropolitan areas still applies in this case. For treated workers 
not in N (nor industry), we find a significant increase in hours of work, due to the reform, in 
5 hours per week, and a sharp reduction of 24% in hourly wages, although only weakly 
significant.
19 That is, our third case for the effects of the reform on labor supply: a net rent 
effect, consistent with the low significance of the effect in the hourly wages, and the 
increase in hours per week.  
 
A note of caution applies here again in relation to the limitations of N to provide a useful 
set of sectors to identify the impact of the reform, mostly given the null effect of the reform 




The reform does not have any significant effect on hourly wages nor hours per week, for 
females under 25. For females older than 25, the only effect of the reform was a reduction 
of 3.6 hours of work per week for the treated in industry, despite an increase of 2.6 hours of 
work per week registered in the sector. Effects in the hourly wages aren’t significant. This 
case is consistent with a working day that finishes only a little time after 6 p.m. for these 
females. Then, the effect of the reform over the wages is not significant in average. 
Meanwhile, the reduction in the hours is unambiguous. 
 
Females older than 25 years drive results of the sample of all females, over which we find 
the similar results. 
 
In short, a conservative reading of the result allows us to conclude that labor reform implied 
a reduction of hourly wages of males older than 25 working in industry in metropolitan 
                                                 
19 Notice that in this case the complement of N would include rural areas.    23
areas, along with a weak increase in their hours of work per week; and a weak increase in 
the hourly wage of those working in the other sectors both in metropolitan areas, and the 
aggregate of the country. On the other hand, the reform reduced the hours of work per week 
of females older than 25 who work in industry both in metropolitan areas, and the aggregate 




This study estimates the effect of labor reform contained in Law 789 of 2002, on hourly 
wages and hours of work of male and female workers. The analysis presents results for 
males and females, younger and older than 25, and for metropolitan areas and the whole 
Country. To identify the parameter of interest, we estimate difference in difference models. 
Despite we do not know the daily hours schedule of workers, we exploit a necessary 
condition for the intervention to affect them, from the regulation concerning the legal 
maximum working session that establishes that it does not cover workers who perform 
directive or managerial activities, or have a position of trust in the employer’s organization. 
This definition, allow us to have treatment and control group in each economic sector, in 
contrast with previous approaches to this problem. 
 
We find that wages of males older than 25 working in industry in metropolitan areas 
decreased more than 11% due to the reform, while females older than 25 working in 
industry in metropolitan areas reduced their hours of work per week in 3.6 hours. We also 
find an increase of up to 8% in hourly wages of males older than 25 not in industry working 
in metropolitan areas, and an increase in the hours of work of those in industry of up to 3.2 
hours per week; although these result are not as robust. On the whole, even though the most 
reliable results we get would not be good news to male workers of industry, there are 
signals of increases in hourly wages for male workers of the other sectors of the economy 
that might bring good news in the short run. Thus, reform implied redistribution of labor 
income towards men older than 25 relative to women and younger men, along with 
reallocation of family labor supply. 
 
It is important to highlight that even though the part of Law 789 that sought to make more 
flexible the daily and weekly work schedule, used the reduction in wages as its main 
instrument, our empirical evidence suggests that previous levels of wages would not have 
been binding by regulation in any economic sector but industry. Thus, employers seem to 
have responded with higher labor demand, for the hourly wages to have kept their previous 
levels. Overall, the reform would have had positive effects on all workers but those in 
industry. 
 
Our results should be read with caution since it is still early to try to get what the definite 
impact of the reform has been so far and will be in the mean time. Better data would 
contribute substantially to get accurate and unbiased impacts of the reform. Information 
relative to current and past hours of work schedule is necessary to improve our estimates. 
The inclusion of a form containing the questions asked to distinguish formal from informal 
workers in the fourth quarter, would also help to get a better assessment of the reform, since 
it is during that quarter when firms would exploit more the advantages of the reform due to 
the positive seasonality in production.    24
 
In short, there is still the need to improve the estimates of current evaluations of the reform 
with better data, and it is important to wait more to observe the definite response from firms 
to the changes introduced by the reform. In light of such limitations, it is clear that having 
introduced in the law the need to analyze the results of the law just two years ahead, in 
order to introduce changes in it or propose it derogation, was highly inconvenient, and has 
introduced an unnecessary factor of uncertainty for both workers and employers. 
Hopefully, the Congress will wait longer before reversing the law, and avoid introducing 
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